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Summary
We look at the contribution of various income components on income inequality and
the changes in this in Belgium. Starting from the Shorrocks decomposition, we apply
bootstrapping to construct confidence intervals for both the annual decomposition and
the changes over time. It appears that the redistributive impact of the Belgian social
security system did not become smaller in an absolute sense between 1985 and 1997,
but - due to the large increase in labour income inequality - only in a proportional
sense.
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1. Introduction
One main objective of social security transfers is to affect the income distribution.
This is closely related to the concept of vertical equity, which “is often identified with
the notion that, all other things equal, more egalitarian distributions are preferred to
those that are more dispersed” (Slesnick, 1998, p. 2149). Departing from this concept
of vertical equity, it is interesting to consider which income sources cause the
observed income inequality. Changes in the distribution of income may result from
changes in the distribution of market income, changes in the social security transfers
and changes in the proportional number of persons receiving one (or more) of the
distinguished income components.
Inequality can be decomposed to subgroups of the population (see for an overview
Dagum, 1997 and Kakwani, 1986, and for an application Schwarze, 1996) or to
various sources of income. It is this last question which will be dealt with in this
article. Rather than concentrating on the overall income inequality and its
development over time, we consider what sources of income cause income inequality
to increase or decrease, i.e. which income factors contribute to what extent to the
inequality of overall income and how does this change over time.
We can disentangle three different ‘levels of complexity’ when assessing the impact
of income sources on the distribution of overall income (OECD, 1997). First of all,
we can examine the distribution of the various income sources across deciles. This
method is easy to apply, but does not reflect the impact of each income source in one
number. Another possibility is to calculate inequality measures for subsequent ‘layers
of income’. For instance, we first derive income inequality of labour income and then
compare it to the income inequality of labour income plus social security income.
This method immediately shows the redistributive effect of these income components.
For example, if we have a Gini coefficient for labour income of, for example, 0.20
and the Gini coefficient for labour income plus pension income amounts to 0.15, then
we can say that the inclusion of pension income with labour income causes income
inequality to decrease. Or, put differently, inequality of labour and pension income is
lower, relative to – and departing from – the inequality of labour income by itself.
This technique is often used, but has some serious drawbacks (Lerman, 1999, p. 341
and further). First of all, interpretation becomes difficult when income sources have
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no natural ordening, as the effect of an income source on inequality might depend on
whether it has been considered before or after another income source; more
specifically, this is the case when income sources are negatively correlated. Secondly,
the effect of subtracting an income source on income inequality also depends on the
size of the income source. So, a change of the (in)equalizing effect of an income
source depends on the change of the size of the income source itself. This latter
change is not taken into account.
From the mid-seventies on, technically more advanced methods to decompose
income inequality emerged. Lerman (1999) discusses several, among which the one
developed by Shorrocks (1982). Shorrocks presented a decomposition which was
more general, and technically superior in the sense that it considered the various
income sources ‘at once’ and which was useable for a (limited) number of inequality
measures. This decomposition method will be used here to shed light on the
redistributive impact of the various income components. However, the Shorrocks
decomposition lacks information with respect to the statistical significance.
Here, we apply the Shorrocks-method and also apply bootstrapping in order to derive
confidence intervals for the contribution of the various income components towards
income inequality. This has been executed for four waves of the Belgian Socio-
Economic Panel: 1985, 1988, 1992 and 1997. This panel nature also allows us to
derive confidence intervals for the changes in the impact of these income components
between successive waves. Here again we apply the bootstrap method. Zandvakili and
Mills (2001) apply partly the same method, but they only distinguish between various
definitions of income and derive in this way among others the impact of the social
security system as a whole So, they do not apply the Shorrocks decomposition and in
this respect their application therefore is limited as compared to ours one. The results
show that the increase in income inequality between 1985 and 1997 results from an
increase in labour income inequality and a more unequal distribution of family
allowances. The unemployment benefits and the sickness and disability benefits have
mitigated the tendency towards larger income inequality. The effect of the
unemployment benefits and the family allowances has also been due to changes in
their proportional contribution into total (gross) income.
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The plan of the paper reads as follows. The method has been described in section 2. In
this section, we also deal with the way in which statistical inference can be dealt with.
Section 3 describes the data used and also the Belgian social security system. The
results can be found in sections 4 and 5. Section 4 focuses on the contribution of the
various income components towards income inequality. Section 5 deals with changes
over time. At last, section 6 concludes.
2. Shorrocks decomposition, including statistical inference
The Shorrocks decomposition shows the effect of each income component on overall
inequality. The difference with the second method described in the Introduction now
becomes clear: there the inequality was derived given the distribution of another
income component and interpreted relative to that income component. In the case of
the Shorrocks decomposition, the contribution of an income component is the average
of two effects, namely
i) the income inequality which would be observed if this income component
“was the only source of income differences” (Shorrocks, 1982, p. 209), i.e.
“assuming all other income components were equally distributed” (OECD,
1997, p. 14) and
ii) the effect of the income component on the inequality of the other income
components, or the correlation between the income component and total
income (Shorrocks, 1983, p. 319).
Without going into the formal details, let Yki denote the income of individual i in
income category k and let Y=ΣkYk be the distribution of total incomes with µ and µk
as the sample-wide mean income, respectively the mean income in category k.
Suppose furthermore that inequality is measured by a function I(Y). The
decomposition rule of Shorrocks now consists of two separate steps (Shorrocks, 1982
and 1983). In the first step, Shorrocks shows that there are an infinite number of
potential decomposition rules, which are all applicable to all kinds of inequality
indices. In the second step, Shorrocks shows that it takes two additional assumptions
to reduce the number of decomposition rules to one. The first of these assumptions is
known as the Absolut Invariant Axiom, which states that “a given income source
makes no contribution to overall inequality if income receipts from this source are
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equally distributed. The second assumes that if total income is divided in two
components whose factor distributions are permutations of each other, then the two
components contribute equally to aggregate inequality.” (Shorrocks, 1983, p. 316).
This assumption is also known as the Two-Factor Symmetry assumption (Shorrocks,
1982). Shorrocks (1983) shows that the contribution of factor k to overall inequality
sk(I) is equal to cov(Yk,Y)/σ2(Y). The denominator of this ratio, cov(Yk,Y), can be
written as ½[CAk + CBk], where CA=I(Yk+(µ-µk)e) and CB=I(Y)-I(Y-Yk+µke). CA and
CB reflect the two effects mentioned before. We know that Σk sk(I)=I(Y), so, the sum
of the contributions of the factors to overall income inequality is equal to the overall
income inequality. This means that (sk(I)×100)/I(Y) is the proportional contribution of
factor k. In this article, we follow the study of the OECD in applying the Shorrocks
decomposition based on the Square Coefficient of Variation, indicated by SCV
(OECD, 1997, p15).
Appealing as the Shorrocks decomposition is, it does not answer the question whether
or not the observed (in)equalising impacts of various sources of income are
statistically significant. The Shorrocks decomposition is not the only technique with
this problem, as for most statistical estimators other than the mean, no formula is
available for the estimated standard errors (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, p. 12).
Moreover, unlike the Gini coefficient and the Theil coefficient (Mills and Zandvakili,
1997), there is no asymptotic measure of statistical inference for the Shorrocks-
decomposition. We therefore apply bootstrapping in order to provide us with the
statistical inference of the Shorrocks decomposition. Bootstrapping is a computer-
based method of statistical inference, based on the drawing of many independent
random observations with replacement from the dataset. From these random samples,
the bootstrap-standard error as well as confidence intervals of the Shorrocks-
decomposition are estimated by their empirical counterparts, based on the bootstrap-
replications (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993, Stine, 1990 for a brief overview and
Mills and Zandvakili, 1997 and Heinrich, 1998, for an application on income
inequality).
3. Data and social security in Belgium
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In 1976, the Centre for Social Policy interviewed for the first time a representative
sample of the Flemish part of the Belgian population. From 1985 on, this was
extended to Belgium, and took the form of a paneldata set, with waves in 1985 (6471
households), 1988 (3779 households), 1992 (3821 households) and 1997 (4632
households). Detailed information on all forms of monthly income, education and so
forth is gathered at both the household and the individual level1. The data is weighted
to correct for selectivity bias and in order to correct for differences in household size,
equivalent incomes are used (using the EU-scale 1, .5 and .3). The income sources for
a household taken into account in this study are total labour income, unemployment
benefit, sickness and disability benefits, pension benefits, child allowances and, lastly,
‘other sources of income’.
The unemployment benefit, which an individual can become eligible to when losing
his job is a certain percentage of the last-earned wage, with an upper and a lower
benefit limit. Moreover, the benefit is expressed in days of unemployment. If an
individual is unemployed for less than the full month or has been working part-time
(at least 1/3 of a full job) before becoming unemployed, the monthly unemployment
benefit ends up below the lower limit.2
The sickness benefit also is a certain percentage of the bounded wage, where the
bounds differ from those for the other benefits. Both the percentages and the bounds
depend on the duration of the sickness and whether or not one is financially
responsible for anyone. If one receives a sickness benefit for more than one year, one
becomes eligible to a disability benefit. As in the case of the sickness benefit, the
benefit depends on the bounded wage (with different bounds, however) and on one’s
marital status (single or cohabiting) or financial responsibility.
For former employees in the private sector and former civil servants, the pension
benefit is a fraction of the average, respectively the final wage (the average wage of
the last 5 years). This fraction depends on the duration of the career of the individual
and can at most be 60% (a single pension) or 75% (a household pension, which means
                                                
1 See Cantillon et al. (1999) for a description of the data, as well as the methodological description and
Proost et. al. (1996) for a validation.
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that the partner loses his or hers own individual pension benefit), after a career of 40
or 45 years (for women and men, respectively). As in the case for the other benefits,
these pension benefits have been subjected to a minimum and a maximum, though
these boundaries are less strict as in the case of the other benefits.
Compared to other countries, the Belgian system of child support is very universal,
meaning that its benefits are independent of income. Moreover, the benefit differs
strongly with the number of children. So, the vertical redistributive effect is weak,
whereas the horizontal redistributive effect is strong (Cantillon et.al., 1995). More
redistributive elements have been added in recent times (Cantillon, et al.,1999, p.
154).
The last income category is called ‘other income’ and has a residual character. It
contains welfare benefits (OCMW), additional unemployment benefits3, additional
pension benefits from pension funds or insurance companies, college grants,
alimonies and rentals. Returns on stocks and bonds are not included in this study,
since they were not considered in the first waves of the panel and because of the
suspicion of underrepresentation of this income component (Cantillon, et al., 1999, p.
33). Some of these income components affect the lower side of the income
distribution (OCMW, alimonies), whereas others are more important to high-earning
households (additional pension benefits, rentals).
4. Results
The results for the Shorrocks-decomposition for Belgium for the period 1985-1997
can be found in table 1. The first data-column of table 1 shows the decomposition of
the SCV attributed to the specific income component. Note that these figures are
averages of 200 bootstrap runs. The second column shows the bootstrap-standard
deviation. The third and fourth columns show the mean and standard deviation of the
proportional contribution of each income component to overall inequality.
[ INSERT TABLE 1]
                                                                                                                                           
2 For a comparison with other systems, see De Lathouwer (1997).
3 Benefits from the “Fondsen voor Bestaanszekerheid” , employer-funded on the sector-level providing
additional benefits in the case of among others technical unemployment.
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The overall SCV amounts to 79.5 in 1985, 89.8 in 1988, 93.0 in 1992 and 121.2 in
1997. We will come back to this later; the first and second columns of table 1 are
merely given for completeness’ sake. The third column describes the proportional
contribution of the income sources to the overall inequality, and these are of more
interest to us. It immediately shows the enormous importance of labour income.
About 75% of overall inequality can be attributed to labour income in 1985. This
percentage even increases via 79% to 90% in 1992 and then returns to 83% in 1997.
Given these high proportions, it is not surprising that the proportional contribution of
the other income components is by far less important. In fact, apart from ‘other
income components’ (which, due to its residual character, is less interesting), the only
significant (negative) contribution to inequality in all years comes from the
unemployment benefit. The negative sign means that these receipts are negatively
correlated with respect to inequality with total income. Household unemployment
benefits cause overall inequality to decrease by 2.5% in 1985. For the other years, this
equalising force increases somewhat, as opposed to what we saw with labour income.
In 1997, unemployment benefits reduce inequality by 2.8%. According to the third
column of table 1, pension benefits have a 2.5% and a 1.2% equalising effect in 1985
and 1988, respectively, whereas it increases inequality by 0.5% and 0.6% in 1992 and
1997, respectively. However, the bootstrap-confidence intervals show that the
hypothesis that the effect of pension income on total income inequality is zero can not
be rejected. The same holds for the effect of the child support benefit on income
inequality up to and including 1992. However, for 1997 we find a significant income
inequality enlarging effect of 0.5%. The effect of the sickness and disability pension
benefit is also ambiguous. In 1985 and 1992, the hypothesis that its effect on overall
inequality is zero can not be rejected. In 1988 and 1997, this benefit has a very small
but distinct equalising effect.
On the whole, the conclusion is that income inequality is to the largest extent caused
by the inequality of labour income (and this effect becomes stronger over time),
whereas the unemployment benefit is the only significant equalising income factor for
all years under consideration. However, the discussion of table 1 answers fewer
questions than it produces: what causes the insignificant results for, say, the pension
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benefit and the child support benefit? Given the description in section 3, one would
expect that these benefits would decrease income inequality quite strongly. There is
more than one answer to this question. First of all, the above table shows the
Shorrocks decomposition for the sample as a whole. It is possible that a certain
income component has a strong effect on the income inequality of a certain group, but
that this strong effect is ‘polluted’ by the other groups of individuals in the sample.
For instance, we can expect that the effect of the child support benefit on income
inequality will be strong for households where the head is younger than 65, whereas
the effect of the pension income will be strong for households where the head is 65 or
older. The second explanation shows why the results of a Shorrocks decomposition
require a careful analysis. It was said earlier that these results are the combination of
two effects CA and CB. The first is the inequality of income if the income component
under consideration was the only one not to be distributed equally. This effect
excludes all interaction effects. The second reflects the correlation between that
income component and total household income. In this case, all interaction effects are
taken into account (Lerman, 1999). CA is by definition positive, but CB may be
negative, indicating that this factor tends to compensate for differences in incomes
received from other sources (Shorrocks, 1982, p. 209). So, the effect of a negative CB
on the Shorrocks-decomposition always is partially compensated by CA, whereas this
compensation does not occur when CB is positive.
The first explanation has been looked at by breaking down the analysis for non-aged
and aged heads of households. It appears that the main determinant of overall income
inequality for the households, of which the head is younger than the retirement age, is
the inequality of labour income. In 1985, almost 82% of total inequality was caused
by this income component.4 For the other years, this percentage increased to 97% and
98% and then decreased again to 93%. The social security incomes all compensate for
this high effect of labour income, though the hypothesis of these effects being equal to
zero can not always be rejected. The unemployment benefit has a quite strong and
significant equalising effect for all years: in 1985, income inequality decreased with
4.3% as a result of the unemployment benefit. This percentage is somewhat higher for
the other years. The equalising effect of the sickness and disability benefit appears to
                                                
4 The tables are available from the authors upon request.
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be considerably smaller, though significant as well. It varies between 1.9% in 1988
and 0.9% in 1985. The fact that the equalising effect of the pension benefit does not
significantly differ from zero in all four years under consideration, is not surprising
given the fact that pension income is by itself a function of the past wage (even
though this relation is not direct), and that it forms about 8% of total household
income of this category of 'young' households. So, it is a combination of pension
income not being very equalising by itself, nor a very important source of income. A
priori, we would expect that the child support benefit would to some extent
compensate for the inequality increasing effect of labour income. This is confirmed
by the data: the child support benefit has a very weak but significant equalising effect.
It decreases income inequality for the young households with 1% or a bit less in 1985,
1988 and 1992. It is only in the last year under consideration that its equalising effect
becomes insignificant.
Income inequality appears to be higher for households where the head is older than
the mandatory retirement age (this is in line with the findings by Meulemans and
Cantillon, 1993 and Dekkers, 1998). The proportional contribution of labour income,
which was on average 92% for young households, is on average 15% now. Its effect
remains significant, however, with the exception in 1988. The main reason for the
difference is of course that the head of the household is no longer working, so the
labour income of the household should come from the partner, or from children in the
household. The role of labour income as the main determinant of inequality has been
taken over by pension income. In 1985, pension income caused about 30.9% of total
income inequality. This percentage then increased via 37.7% in 1988 to no less than
66.1% in 1992, after which it decreased to 45.6% in 1997. This effect significantly
differs from zero in all years and is partially caused by a higher proportional value of
pension income for old households.
It further appears that the inequality-increasing effect of ‘other’ income increases
strongly in comparison with young households and even almost causes 50% of the
inequality of total income in 1985. Elderly proportionally receive higher rents than the
young households do. Moreover, and this is a second explanation, this income
category also includes college grants by the government. This is a highly targeted and
therefore equalising system, with grants paid to households with children who at least
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attain senior vocational training and where both the income as well as the tax-base
value of the house is below a certain level. This system is more beneficiary to young
than to old households. Both these elements explain why ‘other income’ is more
strongly adding to total inequality in the case of the old households, as compared to
the young households5.
The effect of the unemployment benefit and child support benefit is now insignificant.
Another equalising source of income in the case of the young households, the sickness
and disability pension benefit, now becomes insignificant (1988 and 1997) or even
inequality-increasing. However, in this case, the reason for this must be a change of
the ‘pure’ inequality of these benefits, since a change of the proportion can never
cause a change of the sign of the Shorrocks-decomposition.
5. Changes over time
We now look at the impact of the various income components on overall income
inequality over time. The foregoing has been based on 200 bootstrap samples, which
have been randomly drawn from the datasets, separately for each of the four years
under consideration. The resulting bootstrap means and standard errors for the change
over time can then be derived from the standard errors reported in section 4 and their
correlation. Assume sbk,1(I) and sbk,2(I) to be the bootstrap mean contribution of
income factor k to overall income inequality in time point 1 and 2, respectively. Then,
the standard error for the difference amounts to SE(sbk,1(I)) + SE(sbk,2(I)) –
2*COV[sbk,1(I), sbk,2(I)]; see Kalton (1984).
We start by considering the overall change of the SCV (called D) between the four
years under consideration. These results have been shown in table 2.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
                                                
5 It is interesting to see that the proportional size of this income component for the four years under
consideration is a factor 2.13, 1.51, 1.44 and 1.63 higher. The proportional value of the Shorrocks-
decomposition however is a factor 2.7, 8.36, 1.78 and 3.06 higher! So, the increase of the proportional
effect of ‘other income’ on the inequality of total income is only partially caused by the increase of the
proportional importance of the income factor itself. Consequently, the ‘pure’ inequality of this income
category must be higher in the case of old households than in the case of young households. This again
is in line with our expectation that ‘other income’ consists more of rents (which are highly unequal) in
the case of old households, and college grants (which are highly equalising) in the case of young
households.
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Between 1985 and 1988 the overall change of the SCV amounts to 10.37 with a
bootstrap-standard-error of 15.03. Consequently, the hypothesis that this change does
not significantly differ from zero cannot be rejected. This also holds for the change
between 1988 and 1992. Between 1992 and 1997, however, the SCV increased
significantly. For the whole period 1985-1997 D is also significant positive. It
amounts to 42.74 (and a standard deviation of 11.32)
Labour income positively contributes to the changes in the SCV in the course of time.
This contribution is significant at the 10%-level for the period 1985-1988 and 1992-
1997. In the first period, the increase in the SCV is significantly lowered by the
unemployment benefit and the sickness and disability benefit. We further observe a
significant impact with respect to ‘other income’ between 1992 and 1997. As stated,
total inequality increases by 42.74 points between 1985 and 1997. This is largely due
to the increase in labour income inequality (40.01 points). Also child allowances
significantly contribute to the increase in income inequality. On the other hand,
unemployment benefits and sickness and disability benefits have significantly
lowered the increase in total income inequality.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
The changes are only very partly caused by changes in the composition of total
income. Table 3 reports on this. The only significant contribution through this
mechanism during the three periods under consideration concerns the sickness and
disability benefit during the period 1985-1988 and ‘other income’ during the period
1992-1997.  The first one results in a lowering of the growth in the SCV, whereas the
latter strengthens the increasing tendency. Between 1985 and 1997 the contribution of
unemployment benefits lowered, whereas the proportion of family allowances
increased significantly. So, changes in the composition of total (gross) income had an




One of the goals of the social security system is to redistribute income. However,
evaluation of the resulting redistributive impact and the changes in it, seldom occurs.
In the past this might be explained by methodological problems. But actually these
problems have largely been solved by Shorrocks in the 1980s. However, a
disadvantage of the Shorrocks-decomposition is that it lacks information with respect
to the statistical inference. Deriving e.g. confidence intervals on the basis of
bootstrapping can solve this. Here, we use Belgian data to demonstrate the
possibilities of this combined approach. Studying labour income and the social
security benefits, overall income inequality as represented by the square coefficient of
variation has been decomposed into the various components. We also look at the
changes in the course of the period 1985-1997. It appears that the increase in the SCV
by 42.784 points during this period can be attributed largely towards the labour
income component. Child allowances also significantly contributed towards the
increase, but unemployment and sickness and disability benefits limited the increase
in income inequality. As a consequence the contribution of the social benefits towards
the SCV remained stable during the period under investigation. But as labour income
inequality increased, the proportional contribution of the social security benefits
towards the SCV lowered. An important conclusion from this is that the redistributive
impact of the Belgian social security system did not become smaller in an absolute
sense, but - due to the large increase in labour income inequality - only in a
proportional sense.
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1985 Average STD Average STD
Labour 59.652 2.240 0.753 0.045
Unempl. -2.002 0.159 -0.025 0.002
Sickn.&dis. 0.187 0.271 0.002 0.003
Pension -1.943 1.853 -0.025 0.024
Child -0.010 0.126 -0.000 0.001
Other 23.574 4.212 0.295 0.037
Total 79.456 5.128
1988
Labour 72.120 6.411 0.792 0.111
Unempl. -2.421 0.234 -0.026 0.004
Sickn.&dis. -0.719 0.238 -0.007 0.002
Pension -0.905 3.063 -0.012 0.032
Child 0.256 0.177 0.003 0.002
Other 21.491 12.505 0.251 0.097
Total 89.823 14.395
1992
Labour 83.587 3.535 0.902 0.065
Unempl. -2.624 0.337 -0.028 0.004
Sickn.&dis. -0.438 0.377 -0.005 0.004
Pension 0.863 6.895 0.005 0.071
Child 0.305 0.169 0.003 0.002
Other 11.344 2.009 0.122 0.021
Total 93.037 6.440
1997
Labour 99.659 5.407 0.826 0.065
Unempl. -3.450 0.425 -0.028 0.004
Sickn.&dis. -1.029 0.404 -0.009 0.003
Pension 0.925 5.969 0.006 0.048
Child 0.568 0.203 0.005 0.002
Other 24.527 6.777 0.201 0.045
Total 121.201 9.370
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Table 2. Change of SCV between successive years and its bootstrap standard deviation
1988-1985
SCV       s.d.
1992-1988
SCV       s.d.
1997-1992
SCV       s.d.
1997-1985
SCV       s.d.
Labour 12.47 6.840 11.47 7.991 16.07 6.548 40.01 6.150
Unempl. -0.418 0.267 -0.203 0.406 -0.825 0.527 -1.448 0.418
Sickn.&dis. -0.905 0.359 0.281 0.441 -0.590 0.578 -1.216 0.504
Pension 1.038 3.389 1.768 8.007 0.062 9.090 2.868 6.326
Child 0.267 0.212 0.049 0.252 0.263 0.260 0.578 0.234
Other -2.083 12.76 -10.15 12.76 13.18 7.129 0.952 8.804
Total 10.37 15.03 3.214 15.29 28.16 11.49 42.74 11.32
Table 3. Change of the proportion between successive years and its bootstrap standard deviation
1988-1985
proportion           s.d.
1992-1988
proportion           s.d.
1997-1992
proportion           s.d.
1997-1985
proportion           s.d.
Labour 3.9 11.5 11.0 13.1 -7.6 9.4 7.2 8.5
Unempl. -0.1 0.5 -0.2 0.6 0.0 0.6 -3.1 0.5
Sickn.&dis. -0.9 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.4 0.5 -2.4 10.6
Pension 1.3 4.1 1.7 8.1 0.1 8.7 2.8 5.5
Child 0.3 0.3 -0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2
Other -4.4 10.0 -12.9 9.9 7.9 5.0 -9.1 6.6
